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"These oral interviews were conducted between December 2015 and April 2017"--Preface.

Paul David Miller was born in Roanoke, Virginia on 1 December 1941 and spent his childhood years in Newport, Rhode Island and Norfolk, Virginia. He served in the United States Navy from 1964 to 1994, retiring on 31 October 1994 with the rank of admiral. Promoted to admiral (4-star) on 1 February 1991, his final active-duty billets included Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCACOM).

John Warner served the nation in multiple capacities. Shortly before his 18th birthday in January 1945, he enlisted in the wartime Navy, discharged at war's end as a petty officer third class. Graduating from Washington and Lee University in 1949, he earned a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve in his senior year. He then entered law school at the University of Virginia, but his studies were interrupted when he was called up for service in the Korean War, where he flew as a bomb damage assessment observer over enemy territory. Returning to law school after the war, he graduated in 1953 and began a successful legal career that included clerking for a chief judge of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia, serving as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Department of Justice. After joining the campaign staff of then-Vice President Richard Nixon in 1960, he served in private practice until appointed as Under Secretary of the Navy by then-President Nixon in 1969. Subsequently appointed as Secretary of the Navy in 1972, he was the first secretary to have served in uniform in both the Navy and Marine Corps, distinguishing himself by serving as head of the U.S. Delegation which met in Moscow and again in Washington, DC to discuss incidents at sea between U.S. and Soviet naval units, which culminated in his signing on behalf of the U.S. government the Executive Agreement on Incidents at Sea between the United States and Soviet Union on 25 May 1972. Elected as Senator from the State of Virginia, he served with distinction until 2009. His dedicated service in so many important capacities resulted in the Navy naming a Virginia-class submarine after him in 2015, only one of thirteen people so honored while still alive at the time.

Based on an interview conducted by Paul Stillwell in June 1987, the volume contains 106 pages of interview transcript plus a comprehensive index. The transcript is copyright 2012 by the U.S. Naval Institute; the interviewee has placed no restrictions on its use.

Based on seven interviews conducted by Edward J. Marolda from June 2015 through January 2016, the volume contains 727 pages of interview transcript plus an index. The transcript is copyright 2017 by the U.S. Naval Institute; the interviewee has placed no restrictions on its use.

From October 1864 to November 1865, the officers of the CSS Shenandoah carried the Confederacy and the conflict of the Civil War around the globe through extreme weather, alien surroundings, and the people they encountered. Her officers were the descendants of Deep South plantation aristocracy and Old Dominion first families: a nephew of Robert E. Lee, a grandnephew of founder George Mason, and descendants of one of George Washington's generals and of an aid to Washington. One was even an uncle of a young Theodore Roosevelt and another was son-in-law to Raphael Semmes. Shenandoah's mission-commerce raiding (guerre de course)-was a central component of U.S. naval and maritime heritage, a profitable business, and a watery form of guerrilla warfare. These Americans stood in defense of their country as they understood it, pursuing a difficult and dangerous mission in which they succeeded spectacularly after it no longer mattered. This is a biography of a ship and a cruise, and a microcosm of the Confederate-American experience.

After being wounded and awarded the Bronze Star for valor as a Marine infantry platoon commander in Vietnam, Arnold Punaro thought he'd left the battlefield behind. Instead, he redeployed onto the battlefield of Washington politics. For almost fifty years, he's toiled at the intersection of the political and defense establishments, working with such luminaries as Sam Nunn, John Glenn, John McCain, Colin Powell, Robert Gates, Ash Carter, and many others. Today Democrats, Republicans, and career public officials agree on one thing: few individuals possess the military experience, governmental expertise, and personal integrity of Arnold Punaro. Partnered with best-selling writer David Poyer, Punaro offers revelations about the most contentious issues of the past and sage advice for the future. From his military service, to his role formulating and overseeing all major defense and intelligence legislation, Punaro reveals how decisions are really made inside the Beltway, providing insights into the actions of presidents since Jimmy Carter and Secretaries of Defense back to James Schlesinger. Unsparing in his criticisms of both parties, whose partisanship is leading our country over a precipice, Punaro presents radical proposals for much-needed reform to save the country for which so many have given their lives.

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike.On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed.

The radically new homeland security, military, and legal strategies developed by the United States in the months following the terrorists attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are given comprehensive treatment in this book by a former senior Pentagon official, combat veteran, and criminal prosecutor. Stephen M. Duncan draws on a lifetime of military and legal experience to examine the many questions relating to the role of the armed forces in homeland security, including elements of constitutional and criminal law, foreign policy, tradition and custom, federal-state and inter-agency relations, and politics, as well as military strategy and operations. Among the diverse subjects the author discusses are military tribunals and the International Criminal Court, the statute governing the use of military personnel in law enforcement, defense transformation, the constitutional power of the president, and the reorganization of the government to meet the terrorist threat. Duncan also discusses the strategy and tactics used in Afghanistan and Iraq and critically evaluates the nation's political leadership before and after the 9/11 attacks. His book gives readers access to a wealth of information essential to an understanding of the full picture and at the same time puts them in the midst of policy debates to grasp the immediacy of the situation. This important and absorbing historical narrative will attract general readers as well as those with experience in national security issues, politics, and the law.

"When Lt. Cdr. Waldo Drake, USNR arrived in Pearl Harbor in June 1941 as the U.S. Pacific Fleet's first Public Relations Officer (PRO), he was an admired maritime reporter for the Los Angeles Times and Reserve Officer appointed to intelligence duties. By October 1944, he was hated by most of the correspondents assigned to cover the war against Japan and seen by officials in Washington as an obstacle to the development of Navy public relations. What led Drake to become the Pacific Fleet's first PRO, what happened during the three years he served on the CINCPAC staff, and why he was removed from that position are the focus of Nimitz's Newsman: Waldo Drake and the Navy's Censored War in the Pacific. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Adm. Chester Nimitz, USN assumed command of the Pacific Fleet and inherited Drake's services. Drake became responsible for informing America's press about the Pacific Fleet's wartime role and thus gained an outsized ability to influence American public opinion. The Navy's decision to allow public relations officers to censor press copy caused numerous conflicts between Drake and the correspondents assigned to the Fleet. It was Drake's love for the Navy, his tendency to take on every job himself, and above all his close relationship with Adm. Nimitz that allowed him to perform censorship duties with approval. Drake's protection of Nimitz, and his reticence to give the press any information that could endanger operational security or dampen morale, caused Navy victories to go under-reported-much to the consternation of officials in Washington. In analyzing the dynamics of Drake and Nimitz's relationship, and in highlighting Drake's interactions with correspondents and Navy officials, Nimitz's Newsman reveals the inside story of the Navy's censored war in the Pacific during World War II. "--

"The United States is in the midst of a new cold war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and America is losing. That claim, at the core of Michael Sobolik's new book Countering China's Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance, challenges the Washington, D.C. conventional wisdom about U.S.-China relations. Officials in Washington are reacting to the CCP and playing defense. Like America's efforts to contain the Soviet Union in the twentieth-century Cold War, the United States needs a strategic vision to overcome the CCP. Sobolik offers a plan for American victory over the CCP and presents a roadmap to sabotage the crux of the CCP's foreign policy: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At its core, the BRI is not an economic venture. It is a geopolitical gambit. Chinese leader Xi Jinping's "project of the century" has entered its second phase: leveraging yesterday's investments for today's political and military ends. Xi will never do away with the BRI because it is strengthening Beijing's strategic position from Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands to Africa and Latin America. The BRI is the apotheosis of the CCP's grand strategy. America needs a blueprint to take it down. Sobolik provides this blueprint by identifying the BRI's core weakness: imperial overstretch. After identifying China's penchant for empire-building, he identifies the BRI's key weaknesses globally and traces them back to the CCP's vulnerabilities at home. Sobolik's work offers policymakers a plan to go on the offense and win America's new cold war"--

"With updates to every chapter, this new fourth edition serves as the premier guide to professional writing for the naval services. Authored by a naval officer who taught English at two service academies, the book is widely used by officers, enlisted men and women and civilians in both the Navy and Marine Corps. Shenk provides sound, practical advice on all common naval writing assignments across digital and print platforms. Fully revised, the book reflects the changing landscape of professional communication in general and changes in naval culture in the last decade across the fleet, making it an essential guide"--

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former Soviet Union forced America's armed forces to redefine themselves and codify their role as a key element of national power. New threats and emerging technologies changed the very character of war and demanded new strategies and an adaptable military to address them. Jason Q. Bohm began his service to our nation as a Marine at the start of this tumultuous era. He takes the reader on a journey from the turbulent times at the end of the Cold War through the current fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Bohm provides candid and useful historical background as, through a series of personal vignettes and rich operational experience, he describes how Marines translated strategic and operational objectives into tactical actions. In this unique way, he not only tells his story but that of the Marine Corps, and provides an invaluable look at the challenging times confronting Marines.

The second edition of Sea Power presents a complete history of the world's navies from antiquity to the present. From the opening chapter on galley warfare, through a section on Japanese naval history, to the rise and decline of the British navy and the rise and temporary decline of the American navy, readers will find a broad and colorful tapestry woven by respected naval historians.The book focuses on the influences of sea power upon history as well as on naval operations - strategy, tactics, and logistics. It gives due consideration to changes in naval weapons and the administrative reforms brought about because of them. Sea Power is a lively history in which the personalities that shaped events stand out as sharply as the events themselves.

"It is unclear if U.S. policy makers and military leaders fully realize that we have already been thrust into an artificial intelligence (AI) race with authoritarian powers. Today, the United States' peer adversaries-China and Russia-have made clear their intentions to make major investments in AI and insert this technology into their military systems, sensors and weapons. Their goal is to gain an asymmetric advantage over the U.S. military. The implications for our national security are many and complex. Algorithms of Armageddon examines this most pressing security issue in a clear, insightful delivery by two experts. Authors George Galdorisi and Sam J. Tangredi are national security professionals who deal with AI on a day-to-day basis in their work in both the technical and policy arenas. Opening chapters explain the fundamentals of what constitutes big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. They investigate the convergence of AI with other technologies and how these systems will interact with humans. Critical to the issue is the manner by which AI is being developed and utilized by Russia and China. The central chapters of the work address the weaponizing of AI through interaction with other technologies, man-machine teaming, and autonomous weapons systems. The authors cover in depth debates surrounding the AI "genie out of the bottle" controversy, AI arms races, and the resulting impact on policy and the laws of war. Given that global powers are leading large-scale development of AI, it is likely that use of this technology will be global in extent. Will AI-enabled military weapons systems lead to full-scale global war? Can such a conflict be avoided? The later chapters of the work explore these questions, point to the possibility of humans failing to control military AI applications, and conclude that the dangers for the United States are real. Neither a protest against AI, nor a speculative work on how AI could replace humans, Algorithms of Armageddon provides a time-critical understanding of why AI is being implemented through state weaponization, the realities for the global power balance, and more importantly, U.S. national security. Galdorisi and Tangredi propose a national dialogue that focuses on the need for U.S. military to have access to the latest AI-enabled technology in order to provide security and prosperity to the American people"--

As the Commander of U.S. Central Command, General Frank McKenzie oversaw some of the most important - and controversial operations in modern U.S. military history. He had direct operational responsibility for the strikes on Qassem Soleimani and two successive leaders of ISIS, the many months of deterrence operations against Iran and its proxies, and the methodical drawdown in Iraq. He directed the noncombatant evacuation operation in Afghanistan, and our final withdrawal from that tortured country.The Melting Point has three themes. The first one is the importance of the primacy of civilian control of the military. It has become a widely perceived truth that this control has been eroded over the past few years. General McKenzie doesn't believe that to be the case, and he speaks with some authority on the matter arguing that the civ-mil relationship isn't perfect or frictionless, but it doesn't have to be, and probably shouldn't be. It is, however, more durable than many believe, and is supported and embraced by the military to a degree that some critics do not choose to recognize.The second theme is the uniqueness of being a combatant commander. Combatant commanders participate in the development of policy, although as junior partners. They are also responsible for the execution of policy once civilian leaders have formulated their decision, a unique position, and very different than the role of a service chief, or even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. None of these officers are in the chain of command, and they have no ultimate, mortal responsibility or authority for execution. Only the combatant commander stands astride the boundary of decision-making and execution.Finally, the third theme that McKenzie argues is that leaders matter, and the decisions they make have a profound effect on what happens on the battlefield. McKenzie provides an honest assessment of his time in command-describing decisions that were sound, as well as some outcomes he wishes were different. He offers a vivid portrait of leadership in action in one of the most volatile regions of the world.

The Neptune Factor is the biography of an idea-the concept of "Sea Power,"¿a term first coined by Capt. A.T. Mahan and the core thread of his life's work. His central argument was that the outcome of rivalries on the seas have decisively shaped the course of modern history. Although Mahan's scholarship has long been seen as foundational to all systematic study of naval power, Neptune Factor is the first attempt to explain how Mahan's definition of sea power shifted over time.Far from presenting sea power in terms of combat, as often thought, Mahan conceptualized it in terms of economics. Proceeding from the conviction that international trade carried across the world's oceans was the single greatest driver of national wealth (and thus power) in history, Mahan explained sea power in terms of regulating access to 'the common' and influencing the flows of trans-oceanic trade. A nation possessing sea power could not only safeguard its own trade and that of its allies but might also endeavor to deny access to the common to its enemies and competitors.A pioneering student of what is now referred to as the first era of globalization, lasting from the late nineteenth century until the First World War, Mahan also identified the growing dependence of national economies upon uninterrupted access to an interconnected global trading system. Put simply, access to 'the common' was essential to the economic and political stability of advanced societies. This growing dependence, Mahan thought, increased rather than decreased the potency of sea power.Understanding the critical relationship between navies and international economics is not the only reason why Mahan's ideas remain-or rather have once again become-so important. He wrote in, and of, a multi-polar world, when the reigning hegemon faced new challenges, and confusion and uncertainty reigned as the result of rapid technological change and profound social upheaval. Mahan believed that the U.S. Navy owed the American people a compelling explanation of why it deserved their support-and their money. His extensive, deeply informed, and highly sophisticated body of work on sea power constituted his attempt to supply such an explanation. Mahan remains as relevant-and needed-today as he was more than a century ago.

My Men Are My Heroes introduces its readers to a living standard of Marine Corps esprit de corps and military decorum. Sergeant Major Bradley Kasal, the pride of Iowa, is a small town boy who wanted to be a United States Marine even before a poster perfect Marine recruiter marched into his high school gym and offered him a challenge Kasal couldn't resist. Two decades later Kasal stood stiffly at attention, one leg literally shot in half, while the Navy Cross was pinned to his chest. Kasal is currently the Sergeant Major of the Infantry School at Camp Pendleton, CA until he retires in May, 2012. After a brief visit to his childhood Kasal's story quickly gathers steam, introducing the reader to his early Marine career; adventure filled years that earned him the name "Robo-Grunt" from men who don't offer accolades easily. Kasal uses his experience climbing the ranks to illustrate how Marines grow, and how they are shaped by the uncompromising attitudes of the officers and non-coms charged with turning young Marines into tigers. Kasal's adventures culminate in Iraq. By now he is 1st Sergeant Kasal, ramrodding Kilo Company, 3/1, a rifle company in 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, the mighty "Thunder Third" that would cover itself with glory in 2004.Two days into Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 Kilo is ordered to hold open a critical road between two bridges that Saddam's fierce Fedayeen Saddam were just as determined to take away. Kasal makes in his stand on that road, literally standing tall amidst fierce gunfire, demonstrating the kind of leadership Kilo Company needed to get the job done. Kilo's fight was part of the first big test of Marine Corps combat capabilities in the second Iraqi War and the only major engagement the Marine Corps fought during the heady days of the "Drive Up" to Baghdad. When it was over the so-called "Ninjas" of the Fedayeen Saddam were smashed. A week later Kasal was in Baghdad, welcomed with open arms by the exuberant population. A year later 3/1 was back to Iraq, in Anbar Province, the epicenter of the brutal war now raging in the former tribal stronghold of Saddam and his henchmen. The smiling faces that had greeted 3/1 the year before were gone. Kasal is the 1st Sergeant of Weapons Company, 3/1, the armored fist of a light infantry battalion.After four months of ambushes, IEDs, and deadly skirmishes 3/1 is ordered into Fallujah, to take the ancient city back from Al Qaeda and the foreign fighters who had turned the ancient "City of Mosques" into a fortress. It is there, in November, 2004 that the "Thundering Third" entered into Marine Corps legend and Kasal into the Pantheon of Heroes for his actions during the most savage battle the Marines fought in the Iraq War. At a non-descript house in a walled neighborhood in Fallujah Kasal, at the time accompanying a squad of Kilo's riflemen into a contested house, becomes involved in a close-quarter duel with fanatical Chechen fighters. The fight rages throughout the house, at times Marines and the foreign fighters were exchanging rifle fire and grenades at ranges of less than 10 feet. For almost two hours the squad is trapped inside the house. During the brawl Kasal is shot seven times, almost loses his leg when it is nearly severed from his body, and sustains 47 shrapnel wounds when he used his body to shield a wounded Marine laying next to him from an enemy grenade. In the skirmish, forever known as the "Hell House" fight, Kasal was awarded the Navy Cross, the nation's second highest award for heroism."

In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China's turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China's potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China's maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China's history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China's current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China's past as it relates to threats to the country's internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.

Justice at the Margins of War fills two important gaps in the literature on the ethics of national security affairs. First, while thinking about the justice of warfare is highly developed, justifications of intelligence activities--which can involve lying, manipulation, coercion, stealing and even killing to obtain and defend information--are relatively limited and often conflicting. The authors explore relevant ethical principles and then apply them to specific activities--including agent recruitment, human and technical methods of espionage and counterintelligence, interrogational torture, analysis, covert action, sabotage, and assassination. Second, ethical work on interstate conflict occurring in a "gray zone" between war and peace has only just begun. Gray zone operations--the use of low-level lethal and sublethal means to weaken others--are not new. But technological developments have increased the forms, intensity, and significance of this realm of competition. This volume defines the gray zone and discusses moral challenges associated with various operations--including lethal, economic, information, election, legal, and cyber.

"When the China Clipper shattered aviation records on its maiden six-day flight from California to the Orient in 1935, the flying boat became an instant celebrity. This lively history by Robert Gandt traces the development of the great flying boats as both a triumph of technology and a stirring human drama."--

Ana Montes appeared to be a model employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Known to her coworkers as the Queen of Cuba, she was an overachiever who advanced quickly through the ranks of Latin American specialists to become the intelligence community's top analyst on Cuban affairs. But throughout her sixteen-year career at DIA, Montes was sending Castro some of America's most closely guarded secrets and at the same time helping influence what the United States thought it knew about Cuba. When she was finally arrested in September 2001, she became the most senior American intelligence official ever accused of operating as a Cuban spy from within the federal U.S. government.

The Union Navy played a vital role in winning the Civil War by blockading Confederate ports, cooperating with the Union Army in amphibious assaults, and operating on the Mississippi River and its tributaries. To wage this multifaceted war, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles divided the Union Navy into six squadrons. The book examines who Welles assigned to squadron command and why he appointed these officers. Taaffe argues that President Abraham Lincoln gave Welles considerable latitude in picking squadron commanders. Lincoln not only trusted Welles's judgment, but he also understood that the Navy was not as important to the Union war effort militarily and politically as the Army, so there was less of a need for him to oversee closely its operations. Welles used this authority to make appointments to squadron command based on several criteria. Welles factored into his mental calculations seniority, availability, and political connections, but he was most interested in an officer's record, character, and abilities. Although some of Welles's earliest selections left something to be desired, his insight improved markedly as the war continued and he gained a greater understanding of the Navy and its officer corps. Indeed, by the end of the conflict, Welles had become quite ruthless in his search for effective squadron commanders capable of filling the Navy's increasingly difficult missions. In doing so, he contributed greatly to Union victory in the Civil War. The book covers some of the Civil War's most important campaigns and battles, such as the Union assaults on New Orleans, Charleston, Mobile Bay, and Fort Fisher, and the fighting on the Mississippi River.

As Clausewitz observed, "In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect." The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit's skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice.Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.

Xi Jinping has made his ambitions for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) perfectly clear, there is no mystery what he wants, first, that China should become a “great maritime power“ and secondly, that the PLA “become a world-class armed force by 2050.“ He wants this latter objective to be largely completed by 2035. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power focuses on China's navy and how it is being transformed to satisfy the “world class“ goal. Beginning with an exploration of why China is seeking to become such a major maritime power, author Michael McDevitt first explores the strategic rationale behind Xi's two objectives. China's reliance on foreign trade and overseas interests such as China's Belt and Road strategy. In turn this has created concerns within the senior levels of China's military about the vulnerability of its overseas interests and maritime life-lines. is a major theme. McDevitt dubs this China's “sea lane anxiety“ and traces how this has required the PLA Navy to evolve from a “near seas“-focused navy to one that has global reach; a “blue water navy.“ He details how quickly this transformation has taken place, thanks to a patient step-by-step approach and abundant funding. The more than 10 years of anti-piracy patrols in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean has acted as a learning curve accelerator to “blue water“ status. McDevitt then explores the PLA Navy's role in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He provides a detailed assessment of what the PLAN will be expected to do if Beijing chooses to attack Taiwan potentially triggering combat with America's “first responders“ in East Asia, especially the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force. He conducts a close exploration of how the PLA Navy fits into China's campaign plan aimed at keeping reinforcing U.S. forces at arm's length (what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area denial [A2/AD]) if war has broken out over Taiwan, or because of attacks on U.S. allies and friends that live in the shadow of China. McDevitt does not know how Xi defines “world class“ but the evidence from the past 15 years of building a blue water force has already made the PLA Navy the second largest globally capable navy in the world. This book concludes with a forecast of what Xi's vision of a “world-class navy“ might look like in the next fifteen years when the 2035 deadline is reached.

Award-winning author Edward S. Miller contends in this work that the United States forced Japan into international bankruptcy to deter its aggression. While researching newly declassified records of the Treasury and Federal Reserve, Miller, a retired chief financial executive of a Fortune 500 resources corporation, uncovered just how much money mattered. Washington experts confidently predicted that the war in China would bankrupt Japan, not knowing that the Japanese government had a huge cache of dollars fraudulently hidden in New York. Once discovered, Japan scrambled to extract the money. But, Miller explains, in July 1941 President Roosevelt invoked a long-forgotten clause of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to freeze Japan's dollars and forbade it to sell its hoard of gold to the U.S. Treasury, the only open gold market after 1939. Roosevelt's temporary gambit to bring Japan to its senses, not its knees, was thwarted, however, by opportunistic bureaucrats. Dean Acheson, his handpicked administrator, slyly maneuvered to deny Japan the dollars needed to buy oil and other resources for war and for economic survival. Miller's lucid writing and thorough understanding of the complexities of international finance enable readers unfamiliar with financial concepts and terminology to grasp his explanation of the impact of U.S. economic policies on Japan. His review of thirty-seven studies of Japan's resource deficiencies begs the question of why no U.S. agency calculated the impact of the freeze on Japan's overall economy. His analysis of a massive OSS-State Department study of prewar Japan clearly demonstrates that the deprivations facing the Japanese people were the country to remain in financial limbo buttressed its choice of war at Pearl Harbor. Such a well-documented study is certain to be recognized for its significant contributions to the historiography of the origins of the Pacific War.

Ullman offers provocative and challenging arguments to conventional wisdom--that we fail to understand the challenges and dangers and lack a mindset to cope with these twenty-first-century realities.

Twilight Warriors brings a sense of continuity to the shifting, shadowy battlefronts of the Cold War, spanning the postwar decades with one fascinating account after another.