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The huge Soviet submarine fleet was a defining naval element of the Cold War. This is the first full account of the Western - mainly US and British - struggle to master that massive force. That struggle largely defined Western navies during the Cold War. During that period, Western navies had to wrestle with many of the problems they now face, such as shrinking numbers and increasingly potent enemies. With the end of that war, anti-submarine warfare shifted dramatically, to the point that probably no one currently in the Navy recalls the past experience. Yet the past - the subject of this book -- is coming back, as the Chinese field a large and growing submarine force, and the Russians are trying to revive theirs. Although the technology is changing, the past revealed by this book is more and more relevant. This is the first book to describe the whole Cold War struggle against Soviet submarines from the points of view of shifting Western  national and naval strategy, anti-submarine tactics,  changing technology, and the changing character of both the Western and Soviet fleets, including the weapons they wielded. It is based largely on declassified U.S. and British documents (plus some French ones) and on Soviet accounts which appeared during the brief opening of Soviet naval publication after the Cold War.

This book outlines the various threats that cyber warfare poses to operations in the maritime environment (defined broadly) and the abilities of modern navies to defend against those threats. It explains how navies are organized and equipped for cyber operations and the concepts and doctrine adopted by those navies. This includes not just the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, but also the navies of allies (NATO, the Quad), opponents (China, Russia) and others. It also explores the relationship between USN.USMC and USCYBERCOM. Specific issues that the USN and USMC face in conducting defensive and offensive cyber operations include: recruiting, training, and retaining cyber personnel; consolidation (ashore) and distribution (at sea) of command of cyber operations; operational relationship to artificial intelligence (AI); relationship to electromagnetic warfare (EMW) overall; combining cyber with kinetic operations; unique cyber aspects of surface, air, littoral, and undersea warfare; weaponized dependence on space; cyberattacks on naval supply chains; and fleet resilience and cyber security.

Post Transmittal: This will begin to be populated after the AQ is received and the descriptive copy is finalized

This work will argue that the operational intelligence (OpIntel) culture in the U.S. Navy now was codified in the Cold War. The work will also make the case that this existing OpIntel culture is rooted in aircraft carrier culture, a culture which accepts adaptation and favors a structure that has the principles of mission command built in. Additionally, I see this work as having two purposes: 1) making the case that the USN's OpIntel strengths now in an age of Great Power competition are the same as those which guided the USN during the Cold War, and 2) Making the case for the success of USN OpIntel (or viewed another cynical way, that because we are in an era of Great Power competition, that the old methods of OpIntel at sea work, so why change them?) One other argument outside the central argument is that USN OpIntel owes its success to carrier culture specifically, so there is an aviation culture angle here. One other point the author raises in his proposal is that this evolution of OpIntel at sea in the face of the Soviet threat fostered a culture of trust between USN commanding officers and their intel officers.

Building upon the expertise of the authors and historians of the Naval Institute Press, the Naval History Special Editions are designed to offer studies of the key vessels, battles, and events of armed conflict. Using an image-heavy, magazine-style format, these special editions should appeal to scholars, enthusiasts, and general readers alike. Rarely is an aircraft design so inspired that it brings forth near-universal recognition and acclaim. In more than 110 years of naval aviation history and more than 50 years of Vought Corsairs in active-duty squadrons, one Corsair model, the F4U, stands alone. In that time, only a few naval aircraft have been acknowledged as game changers that singularly tipped the balance in air combat. The Vought F4U Corsair heads a short list of such aircraft by dint of its supremely efficient lines—a melding of the highly developed Double Wasp powerplant, the outsized Hydromatic propeller that it drove, and the finely tuned airframe that wrapped it.  Navy and Marine Corps aviators held the Corsair in high esteem for its ruggedness, speed, and adaptability as a fighter and a bomber, long after its first appearance in the South Pacific during World War II, through the closing weeks of the Korean War. The Corsair’s potency made it sought after by allied air forces long after its final days in U.S. inventory, rendering vital service in French livery at Dien Bien Phu and, finally, with South American air forces in the so-called  “Soccer War” of the late 1960s.  Here is the complete history of this storied aircraft, from early design through the legendary dogfights of Maj. Gregory “Pappy” Boyington’s Black Sheep Squadron over the Pacific, and in operations in Korea.

Much like Carol Reardon’s Launch the Intruders: A Naval Attack Squadron in The Vietnam War, 1972, this book will look at the War in the Pacific from August 1942 through January 1945 and demonstrate that one unit’s example was indicative of a wider whole. This book was birthed out of the August 2019 issue of Naval History titled “The Tale of Eleven,” which details the exploits of Carrier Air Group 11 during World War II. CVG-11 was composed of three to four squadrons of aircraft, most memorably fighter squadron VF-11, nicknamed the Sundowners for the dual nature of downing the rising sun of Japan and for the term indicating hard working sailor. CVG-11 saw action early in the war at Guadalcanal during its first tour and was later assigned to the USS Hornet in 1944 and fought at Leyte Gulf, Luzon, Mindoro, French Indochina, and Okinawa. The fighter squadron produced several aces during the war. The book will also demonstrate the exploits of the other two squadrons, illustrious in their own right: VB-11 and VT-11.

Based primarily on original sources and contemporary accounts, this book is an account of the life and times of Benjamin Clough. Set in the golden age of whaling, the book follows him from the time he first went to sea in 1835 as a teenager to his retirement from whaling in 1867 as a veteran whaling captain and his life thereafter. It crosses the world’s oceans, providing the reader with an understanding of whaling from a first-hand perspective over a thirty-year period from the South Atlantic to the northern Pacific and then on into the Arctic Ocean. It is a gritty portrayal of the hardships, dangers, and harsh working conditions endured by whalers during this period. Clough’s life ashore during the intervals between voyages and after retiring from the sea featured its own unique experiences, offering a window into nineteenth-century life in Martha’s Vineyard.

In this third edition of the Chief Petty Officer’s Guide, author Paul Kingsbury offers the same caliber of wisdom and advice that has helped Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) succeed for decades. Fully revised, this edition features updates to every chapter as well as a broader context, scope, and audience. With the addition of guidance for Navy and Coast Guard chiefs of all experience levels, aspiring petty officers seeking advancement to chief, and other leaders, this book is a vital tool for anyone who wants to understand how great chiefs think, manage, and lead.Those striving to improve as a chief, senior chief, or master chief will find this handbook an essential resource on how to lead and manage strong maintenance and operational teams. Kingsbury provides key perspectives on how chiefs can use power bases, influence tactics, and managerial skills to achieve mission success at all levels of Navy and Coast Guard leadership. Chapters feature tools for self-assessment, including explanations of the attributes, behaviors, and qualities that all petty officers (or any leader or manager) should strive for.

Airpower over the Rhine is a critical new perspective on the air battle between the French Air Force (FAF) and the Luftwaffe in the skies over France during May and June 1940. Why were the French overpowered in the air? What factors led to their defeat? Author James F. Slaughter III examines how each country's leadership created the circumstances that enabled the Luftwaffe's victory over the FAF and Germany's ultimate defeat of France.  Conventional wisdom-especially in the English-speaking world-purports that the FAF was a nonentity whose loss was all but guaranteed. But the FAF did, in fact, show up to fight. With virtually every disadvantage and under impossible conditions, FAF pilots nevertheless managed to land significant blows against the Luftwaffe-far more than they are given credit for today. Slaughter traces this misconception to a largely collaborationist cover-up beginning with the Rion Trials in Vichy France that was then perpetuated by Cold War politics and popular mythology.  Rather than absence or incompetence, the FAF lost due to a series of complex internal conflicts within French leadership, both political and military, that set them up to fail. This work compares and examines six fundamental areas that affected the development of the FAF and the Luftwaffe: aircraft and equipment, the aircraft industries, intelligence, the experiences of the Spanish Civil War, doctrine and training, and politics and air power. It also offers new details about and insights into Pierre Cot, a controversial French politician largely unknown outside France. Airpower over the Rhine explains Cot's internal and external impact on the development of the French Air Force and details what is known about his apparent efforts to spy for the Soviet Union. Thoroughly researched and compellingly written, this book will appeal to anyone with an interest in World War II.

F/A-18 pilot combat veteran and lead Blue Angels Pilot Frank Weisser distills in this accessible volume the elemental lessons he's learned for facing challenges in life and work.“Pull your green ring! Pull your green ring!” That came through loud and clear over the radio despite all the other talking between the various jets and the controllers. It was my Division Leader, one of our Squadron’s most senior pilots, on a night flight during my first period flying off the aircraft carrier. I had unknowingly fallen victim to Hypoxia and was minutes, if not seconds, away from dying as I very much intended to softly land in a nearby swamp so I could get some much-needed rest. Moments later, having pulled the green ring resulting in pure oxygen being delivered instantly, I looked outside and said “Holy Sh*t. I’m flying. And it’s nighttime.” From the cockpit of an F/A-18 Hornet, U.S. Navy Commander Frank Weisser conveys the lessons he learned flying as the Lead Solo for the Blue Angels, on multiple combat deployments, and as stunt pilot for Top Gun: Maverick. So, how do you deal with adversity in your daily life? How do organizations and teams deal with it? Or develop trust? What happens the moment something goes wrong? Each chapter opens with a flight sequence, and describes a lesson, skill, or value that Weisser learned in the sky and that carried him through a life of service with the Navy: finding focus, developing trust, opening communication, overcoming adversity, facing failure, and recognizing courage within oneself. With a focus on the instructors, flight team members, and colleagues who taught and guided him, this short, accessible book contains wisdom for everyone on how to live thoughtfully, with courage, and well.

This comprehensive biography details the life of Rear Admiral John Lorimer Worden, who commanded the ironclad USS Monitor during the 1862 Battle of Hampton Roads and went on to co-found the U.S. Naval Institute.Throughout his 52-year career, Rear Adm. John Lorimer Worden was always the right officer for the job. The epitome of an innovative commander who helped move the U.S. Navy out of the age of sail and into the era of ironclad technology, Worden’s contributions extended beyond the Battle of Hampton Roads and shaped the future of the Navy. He demonstrated exceptional leadership in both combat and peacetime. Worden immediately proved himself a capable choice for key assignments, leading a successful rescue mission and capturing a prize ship during the Mexican-American War. Three tours at the U.S. Naval Observatory established him as a scientific officer. After delivering secret dispatches in 1861 that kept Fort Pickens in Florida for the Union, Worden attempted to return to Washington, D.C., and was arrested by Confederate authorities, thus becoming the first prisoner of war during the Civil War. After six months in captivity, he returned to command the USS Monitor—the “little ship that saved the nation”—at the historic Battle of Hampton Roads. There, he faced the Confederate CSS Virginia in the first-ever clash of ironclads, suffering severe wounds while fighting the battle to a standstill. Upon recovery, he returned to command the USS Montauk, where his unparalleled expertise in ironclad design and combat tactics continued to set him apart. From testing ships in battle to overseeing the innovative production of ironclads at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, he consistently refined his craft. Confronted with multiple ship design failures, he relentlessly drove improvements, pushing the boundaries of naval technology and securing lasting progress in the development of modern warships.  After the war, Worden became superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, where he trained the next generation of naval officers and co-founded the U.S. Naval Institute. His five-year tenure at the academy was not without controversy that tested his leadership. He deftly handled a nationally embarrassing hazing scandal, resulting in congressional authority for the superintendent to directly discipline and expel errant midshipmen. Worden also managed sensitive issues surrounding the appointment of the first African American midshipman and the first Japanese midshipman while he helmed the academy. Worden capped his career by ably serving as commander-in-chief of the European Squadron during a time of upheaval on that continent. Displaying courage, commitment, and diplomacy, Worden skillfully led U.S. European naval forces from 1875 to 1877. From Ironclads to Admiral’s thorough examination of Worden’s life and leadership emphasizes his strategic insights, innovative spirit, and dedication to service. Readers will uncover the profound impact of an officer of great achievement who inspired others to say, “Let Worden do it!”

In Destroyers at War Adm. James L. Holloway III, the twentieth Chief of Naval Operations, recalls his early life and service on destroyers during the final campaigns of the Pacific War in World War II. As the assistant gunnery officer in USS Ringgold (DD 500) and the gun boss on USS Bennion (DD 665), he took part in shore bombardment and anti-air radar picket missions during the assaults on Saipan, Tinian, Peleliu, and Leyte. He provides detailed explanations of how gunnery systems worked on small combatants as well as gripping accounts of combat events, including the climactic battle of Surigao Strait—the last battleship-vs-battleship clash in history—where a Bennion torpedo scored a fatal blow against the Japanese battleship Yamashiro.  This book also explores the relationship between Holloway and his father, James L. Holloway Jr.—the only father-son combination to serve on active duty as four-star admirals—and highlights the senior Holloway’s career as his son worked his way through the ranks. Holloway will be one of the last members of the Greatest Generation to publish a firsthand account of World War II.

How have navies contemplated possible enemies? How did they learn—or fail to learn—once operations began? How does this analysis inform today’s planning for future conflict? These questions guide the noted historians and naval strategists who contributed to Planning for War at Sea. A central theme is the regular failure of navies’ best-laid plans.Covering four centuries of naval warfare, the early chapters illustrate the challenges all navies faced when considering possible enemies. Even during the Age of Sail, ships were among the most expensive and long-term national endeavors. Navies thus planned well in advance for future wars, usually without knowing their adversaries or how they would fight them at sea. This strategy holds true today. Building a capable navy requires sustained investment in naval infrastructure long before the fighting starts.In the final chapters naval strategists expand on this historical analysis to address how effectively or ineffectively today’s three leading navies—Russia, China, and the United States—have configured themselves during the post–Cold War era in preparing for future great power conflict. This collection is an important work for strategists, scholars, and policymakers.

For more than half of its existence, members of the Marine Corps largely self-identified as soldiers. It did not yet mean something distinct to be a Marine, either to themselves or to the public at large. As neither a land-based organization like the Army nor an entirely sea-based one like the Navy, the Corps' missions overlapped with both institutions. This work argues that the Marine Corps could not and would not settle on a mission, and therefore it turned to an image to ensure its institutional survival. The process by which a maligned group of nineteenth-century naval policemen began to consider themselves to be elite warriors benefited from the active engagement of Marine officers with the Corps' historical record as justification for its very being. Rather than look forward and actively seek out a mission that could secure their existence, late nineteenth-century Marines looked backward and embraced the past. They began to justify their existence by invoking their institutional traditions, their many martial engagements, and their claim to be the nation's oldest and proudest military institution. This led them to celebrate themselves as superior to soldiers and sailors. Although there are countless works on this hallowed fighting force, How the Few Became the Proud is the first to explore how the Marine Corps crafted such powerful myths.

One of the most difficult security challenges of the post-Cold War era has been stabilizing failing states in an era of irregular warfare. A consistent component of the strategy to address this problem has been security force assistance where outside powers train and advise the host nation's military. Despite billions of dollars spent, the commitment of thousands of advisors, and innumerable casualties, the American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq failed catastrophically. Nevertheless, among those colossal military disasters were pockets of success. The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) held back the Islamic State in 2014 long enough to allow American and allied forces to flow back into the country, and many Afghan commando units fought to the bitter end as their country disintegrated around them. What made those units successful while the larger missions ended disastrously? Author Frank K. Sobchak explores security force assistance across five case studies, examining what factors were most critical for U.S. Special Forces units to build capable partners like the ISOF and the commandos. More specifically, the book assesses the impact of five components of Special Forces advisory missions: language training and cultural awareness of the advising force; the partner force-to-advisor ratio; the advisors' ability to organize host-nation forces; whether advisors are permitted to guide in combat; and the consistency in advisor pairing. Based on the experiences of U.S. Army Special Forces in El Salvador (1981-1991), Colombia (2002-2016), the Philippines (2001-2015), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2007-2021), Sobchak argues that the most crucial factors in producing combat-effective partners are consistency in advisor pairing and maintaining a partner force-to-advisor ratio of twelve special forces soldiers advising a company-sized force or smaller. Intriguingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, at first glance language training and cultural awareness do not seem to be critical factors, as most of the Green Berets that trained units in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked both capabilities. Despite an orthodoxy that argues the opposite, there is little evidence that combat advising is decisive in producing effective partners and there is conflicting evidence that language training and cultural awareness are important. Many of these findings, while focused on Special Forces operations and doctrine, could be used to improve the odds of success for larger security-force assistance missions as well.

This book is a unique combination of intellectual history, personal memoir, and military theory. When Conrad Crane retired from twenty six years of active duty to become a research professor at the Army War College, he never expected to become a modern Cassandra, fated to tell truth to power without being heeded. As he watched the world change after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, he warned the Army that it was not prepared for Phase IV stability operations, counterinsurgency, and eventually the reconstruction of Iraq. Eventually his work attracted the attention of Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who along with his Marine counterpart James Mattis, was launching a broad program to make the American military a learning organization better prepared for modern war. Crane soon found himself in charge of a team of Soldiers, Marines, and civilian academics with the mission to create the very counterinsurgency doctrine he had pleaded for. For the next year he wrestled with conflicting ideas, complex personalities, and bureaucratic inertia to create the groundbreaking Field Manual 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. The process was long and tortuous, and much more complicated than the way it has been characterized so far in other narratives. The end result was a unique blend of traditional and modern theory, tempered by hard lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Its principles and paradoxes of counterinsurgency, focus on legitimacy, and concepts of operational campaign design have had immense influence on US and NATO doctrine. The new doctrine was not perfect, and had been rushed through production in record time, but the guidance it provided would be an essential element in the Surge in Iraq that secured breathing space for the nascent Iraqi government to solve its political differences. Crane found that out when General Petraeus asked him to come observe the Surge himself in late 2007. Traveling all around that embattled nation, Crane watched the greatest counterinsurgency force the world had ever seen adapting to the exigencies of modern counterinsurgency is a very complex environment. He describes in great detail the hard work of dedicated Soldiers, Marines, and civilians that were creating a mosaic peace out of a mosaic war, in places as disparate as Baghdad, Anbar Province, and the detention facilities at Bucca. There were still problem areas, such as in the British zone and Diyala Province, but the conflict was definitely trending in the right direction. Crane closes his book with an account of what went wrong in Iraq, as the mosaic peace unraveled with the Americandeparture, and also how the new counterinsurgency doctrine was never properly resourced or applied in Afghanistan. His final chapter covers the lessons be believes should be gleaned from the past decade and a half of global war. There have been many critics of the new doctrine, and Crane recounts their arguments and concedes that promises of counterinsurgency were oversold. But much of what has been labeled as counterinsurgency is really just modern warfare, and while the United States is understandably reluctant to engage in further irregular conflicts and nation building, they remain a growth industry in the rest of the world. The United States government, military and civilian agencies, must be prepared to do better next time. And Cassandra says, there will be a next time.

How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking. With that thought in mind, the contributors to Strategy, each a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, widely considered the Department of Defense's premier school of strategy, offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power. Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, must employ critical thinking where the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace are concerned. Strategy examines various sub-disciplines regarding the use of power, and illuminates different approaches to thinking which have implications beyond the implementation of force.

The U.S. Marine Corps' four-year campaign against al Qaeda in Anbar is a fight certain to take its place next to such legendary clashes as Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Chosin, and Khe Sanh. Its success, the author contends, constituted a major turning point in the Iraq War and helped alter the course of events and set the stage for the Surge in Baghdad a year later. This book brings to light all the decisive details of how the Marines, between 2004 and 2008, adapted and improvised as they applied the hard lessons of past mistakes. In March 2004, when part of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) was deployed to Anbar Province in the heart of the Sunni triangle, the Marines quickly found themselves locked in a bloody test of wills with al Qaeda, and a burgeoning violent insurgency. By the spring of 2006, according to all accounts, enemy violence was skyrocketing, while predictions for any U.S. success were plummeting. But at that same time new counterinsurgency initiatives were put in place when I MEF returned for its second tour in Anbar, and the Marines began to gain control. By September 2008 the fight was over. Richard Shultz, a well-known author and international security studies expert, has thoroughly researched this subject. His book effectively argues the case for the Marines changing the course of the war at Anbar, which is contrary to the conventional wisdom that the Surge was the turning point.

Operation KE explores the air combat that attended the Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal in early 1943a topic which has hitherto received very little attention. Operation KE was successful largely because Japanese strategic planning and tactical execution was basically sound. The traditional view holds that the Japanese got away with the initiative largely because the Americans let them; the U.S. Pacific high command felt it was not worth the effort to try and stop them. The authors contend that this was not entirely the case. They argue that the Cactus Air Force and Guadalcanal-based naval units did their best to disrupt the evacuation, still believing that the Tokyo Express was bringing reinforcements and supplies to the 17th Army. Other US forces in the South Pacific did make a half-hearted and questionably-executed attempt to stop the Japanese, but were bluffed into adopting a "e;wait-and-see"e; posture.Operation KE focuses on the air war fought between the Cactus and US 13th Air Forces on the one hand and the Japanese Navy and Army Air Forces on the other, from mid-December, 1942 to mid-February, 1943. The book scrutinizes the US air strikes against the six KE-related Tokyo Express destroyer runs, plus related air strikes against the Japanese merchant marine, as well as air and naval base-suppression missions undertaken by both sides, to determine what actually happened in order to analyze why the Japanese evacuation succeeded and why Cactus failed to stop it. Background chapters attempt to assess the respective states of readiness of the Japanese and US air arms in the South Pacific to support on the one hand and counter on the other the execution of Operation KE.The central portion of the book narrates in some detail what actually occurred in the air and at sea -- including air strikes, fighter sweeps, base suppression missions, and naval sorties -- during the crucial prelude to and the actual playing out of the interrelated events that comprised the evacuation operation. Concluding chapters analyze, on both strategic and tactical levels, the Japanese planning and execution of Operation KE, and Cactus' initiatives to interdict KE's successful prosecution. The authors conclude that both the Japanese and the American states of readiness on the eve of Operation KE suffered in such matters as optimizing both resources and operating procedures, and combating a hostile environment. Consequently, both combatants were somewhat handicapped in their abilities respectively to carry out and contest Operation KE.The author contends that the Japanese developed a reasonably sound strategy that exploited those methods and tools of war then in use in the South Pacific; to achieve success, they maximized their own strengths while taking advantage of their adversary's limitations. Contrary to the traditional view, the authors are of the opinion that Japanese utilization of their newly-built airstrip at Munda in the Central Solomons played an important role in the success of Operation KE, which was in keeping with the long-range intention of developing Munda and Vila airstrips as major forward airbases to defend against any Allied push toward Rabaul through the Solomons.The U.S., on the other hand, by consistently misreading Japanese intent regarding Operation KE and pursuing a cautious offensive strategy, blunted the tactical impact of their initiatives to counter the evacuation. Several imprudent tactical decisions and a misallocation of resources further diluted the strength of US efforts.

Six Victories examines one of the most interesting and instructive naval campaigns of World War II: the war on traffic in the Mediterranean during the fall and winter of 1941-42. It is a cautionary tale of how sea power was practiced, and how it shifted 180 degrees overnight. Based on British and Italian archival sources, the book emphasizes strategic context, the role of intelligence, and the campaign's logistics.In October 1941 the British Admiralty based a surface strike force in Malta to attack Axis sea lanes between Italy and Africa. Aided by Ultra intelligence, submarines, and bombers based in Malta, this force dominated the Central Mediterranean. From the end of October through the middle of December 1941, less than a third of the supplies shipped from Italian ports arrived in Libya. Shortages of ammunition and fuel finally compelled the Afrika Korps to retreat four hundred miles. Then, in the space of thirty hours, this all changed. First, Italian naval forces broke the blockade by fighting through a major convoy that arrived in time to blunt the British advance; next, the strike force plowed into a minefield laid by Italian cruisers; and finally, in a daring attack, Italian commandos crippled the Mediterranean Fleet's battleships in port. The swing in fortune was immediate and dramatic.Six Victories breaks new ground in the historiography of World War II. A compelling story, it relates lessons that are relevant today and should be required reading for all who practice the art of power at sea and for those who want to understand the intricate and interrelated factors that are the foundations of military success.

This book addresses three important facets of Chinas modern development. First is the ongoing modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The Chinese navy has grown from a relatively small, backward force in the 1980s into a capable twenty-first century maritime power. The PLAN now deploys around the world and includes nuclear-powered submarines, the first of several aircraft carriers, modern guided missile destroyers and frigates, and the worlds most formidable force of seagoing cruise and ballistic missiles. This modern, growing navy is intended in significant part to undergird Chinas global search for energy sources and security. Beijings determination to maintain its historic economic growth depends on energy security. These two national prioritiesa navy capable of defending Chinas national security and economic interests and secury energy resourcescome together to define and support Chinese foreign policy. This book addresses these three in both global and Asian contextual terms, with special emphasis on relations between China and the United States.

Less than five years after naval aviation led the forces that defeated Imperial Japan that very organization was in serious trouble. The force had been drastically reduced and, despite the Korean War, growing sentiment supported by no less than the chairman of the Joint Chiefs argued that the new Air Force could do anything naval aviation might be required to do. Meanwhile, the naval aviation mishap rate soared. The very survival of naval aviation was at stake. It took fifty years to turn this around. Today, in spite of hot wars, cold wars, contingencies, and peacetime operations in support of friends and allies, the Navy and Marine Corps accident rate is at least as good as that of the Air Force, and it approaches that of commercial aviation. Gear Up, Mishaps Down explains that this accomplishment was achieved through dedicated and professional leadership, a focus on lessons learned from mishaps and near-mishaps, a willingness to learn from other enterprises, and by better leadership, training, maintenance, supply and more.

Keep from All Thoughtful Men overturns much accepted historical dogma on how World War II strategy was planned and implemented. It is taken for granted that the Axis powers were defeated by an avalanche of munitions that poured forth from pitiless American factories. So it is amazing that the story of how this "miracle of production" was organized and integrated into Allied strategy and operations remains untold. Keep from All Thoughtful Men is the first book that tells how revolutions in both statistics and finance changed forever the nature of war. While the book relates the overall story of how economics dictated war planning at the highest levels, more specifically it tells how three obscure economists came to have more influence on the conduct of World War II than the Joint Chiefs. Because military historians rarely understand economics and economic historians just as rarely involve themselves with the details of war, there has never been a military history that shows how economics influenced the planning of strategy and the conduct of any war. This is sadly true of even World War II, which has been called by Paul Samuelson, "The Economist's War."

This book is concerned with both the national security concerns of Asian maritime nations and the security of the Asian maritime commons. These are defined as the Pacific and Indian Oceans and associated seas, bays, and gulfs, with their included sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The most useful geographical designation for maritime Asia is the "Indo-Pacific." Bernard Cole provides both a survey of the maritime strategies of the primary nations of the Indo-Pacific region and an evaluation of the domestic and international politics that drive those strategies. The United States, Canada, Russia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Iran, the smaller Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf states are all surveyed and analyzed. The United States, Japan, China, and India not surprisingly draw the most attention, given their large modern navies and distant strategic reach. The author concludes that the United States remains the dominant maritime power in this huge region, stretching from Canada to the Persian Gulf, despite its lack of a traditionally strong merchant marine. U.S. maritime power remains paramount, due primarily to its dominant navy. The Chinese naval modernization program deservedly receives a good deal of public attention, but Cole argues that on a day-to-day basis the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, as its navy is named, is the most powerful maritime force in Far Eastern waters, while the modernizing Indian Navy potentially dominates the Indian Ocean. In fact, a focus of this work is the exemplary description of all the region's navies, with the author noting the naval arms race that is underway, particularly in the area of submarine acquisition. Cole is careful to couch this phenomenon in the regional concerns about Chinese naval expansion and the desire to ensure a continued, massive U.S. naval presence. The current naval developments in the region evince elements of a naval arms race, but lack the coherent maritime strategies to make naval developments dangerous to regional peace and security. Most telling will be whether United States power and focus remain on the region, while adjusting to continued Chinese maritime power in a way acceptable to both nations. No other current or recent work provides such a complete description of the Indo-Pacific region's navies and maritime strategies, while analyzing the current and future impact of those forces.