Böcker av Stephen J. Cimbala

This book analyzes the United States and Russia's nuclear arms control and deterrence relationships and how these countries must lead current and prospective efforts to support future nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.

In the twenty-first century, the United States confronts an international system of great complexity and shifting security challenges. Among these challenges are those posed by nuclear weapons. This book deals with this topic.

In Part II, three chapters discuss the U.S. response to the Soviet threat in terms of U.S. strategy for war in Europe, strategic defense policies, and technology and policy choices.

The events of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan make an obvious case for expert study of the George W. Bush defense program. During the Bush administration, the rise and fall of governments, the fates of peoples, and the very definitions of "war" and "victory" were up for discussion.

Russia is a post-communist country struggling to adapt to the modern world economically and politically. In the twenty-first century, Russia faces postmodern social, cultural, and political problems with its old policy of deterrence.

This is an excellent advanced study in strategy in the nuclear age. . . . . Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.

In this comprehensive study, eminent scholars address all aspects of U.S. deterrence policy from both technical and policy aspects.

This study is an initial effort to assess the post-Cold War international environment in terms of its implications for the relationship between force and policy.

The profound political changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe during 1989 have forced the United States and its Western European allies to reevaluate both their long held military strategy of nuclear deterrence and the traditional role of NATO in European affairs. In this volume, Stephen Cimbala considers the ways in which American military priorities will have to change now that the tangible threat to Europe has been removed, exploring the options available to America and NATO given the new political and economic realities in Europe and the Soviet Union. Drawing upon a rich literature of Soviet and American defense strategy, Cimbala examines the structure and effectiveness of deterrence as a military strategy, the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons, the likely course of future conflicts, and alternative military strategies.Following an introductory chapter which defines the concepts of deterrence and dissuasion and offers an overview of the changing character of European politics, Cimbala reviews the political context for the development of military strategy in Europe. Subsequent chapters consider the relationship between military stability and the likelihood of winning wars in their initial stages, analyze the issue of deterrence during war, discuss the potential for atypical wars in the future, and investigate the linkages between deception and deterrence. A separate chapter addresses the attempt to substitute non-nuclear dissuasion for nuclear deterrence, in the form of anti-nuclear strategic defenses which could defeat nuclear offenses. In the final chapter, Cimbala summarizes his conclusions and makes some additional observations about the implications of our new view of NATO and deterrence. Students of international relations, foreign policy, and military studies will find Cimbala's work enlightening and provocative reading.

Knowing how to end war and to prevent the escalation of conflict is of paramount importance today when weapons of mass destruction have spread beyond the control of major powers and democratically accountable governments, and when regional and global stability have become more precarious.

Explores a problem of military uncertainty - first strike stability. It seeks to clarify the kind of bargains superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems, and to enhance understanding of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence.

?Cimbala's conclusions are judicious and merit careful consideration. This is a book well worth reading." -- Alan Ned Sabrosky, Ph.D. Director of Studies Dept. of the Army U.S. Army War College "This is a very reflective and thoughtful analysis of the real issues on Soviet and American planning for the possibility of nuclear war, and for the maintenance of deterrence. Thoroughly up-to-the minute on the issues and concepts it discusses, it at the same time avoids falling for the misleading fads and trends of the moment. The book is very readable, but never at the price of over-simplifying the issues.?-George H. Quester Professor and Chairman The University of Maryland

An important contribution to the international relations and military studies literature, this study considers the problem of conflict termination in Europe--an area of immense strategic importance to both the United States and the Soviet Union.

If a nuclear war between American and Soviet forces or the forces of their allies were to start, how would it end? This soberting analysis, one of the few published treatments of War termination, identifies the policies and strategic issues involved in the attempt to control and end a nuclear war should one ever start. The author presents both a comprehensive overview of the theory of war termination and a broad-based analysis of the specific aspects of the question. Throughout, the aim is to provide policymakers and students of military strategy with a tool for improved strategic war planning that emphasizes the importance of flexibility and durability rather than the current emphasis on damage infliction.Cimbala begins by discussing the compelling reasons for studying war termination, among them the potential deterrent value of such study. He then introduced pertinent issues in the literature of war termination, including the notion of an `agreed battle', escalation control, intrawar deterrence, and coercive diplomacy. The bulk of the study is devoted to a detailed discussion of specific aspects of nuclear war determination. Ih his concluding chapter, Cimbala integrates these aspects into a coherrent theory of nuclear war termination and assesses the potential implications of strategic defenses for American nuclear deterrence strategies.

This is the most comprehensive view of nuclear weapons policy and strategy currently available. The author's division of the nuclear issue into the three ages is a never seen before analytical construct. With President Obama reelected, the reduction and even elimination of nuclear weapons will now rise to the top of the agenda once more. Moreover.

In Russia and Armed Persuasion, Stephen J. Cimbala argues that Russia's war planners and political leaders must make painful adjustments in their thinking about the relationship between military art and policy.

War is the most uncertain of human political and social activities. In an alliance among states for the promotion of collective defense or security, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), burdens have to be shared. This title presents a study that looks at the experience of the United States and other member states of NATO.

A study of how the information age in modern warfare coexists with the persistent appeal of nuclear weapons and its impact on crisis management. It focuses on this unplanned coexistence of two distinct arts of war, including the possibility that states like the US may be held hostage to nuclear blackmail by "outlier" regimes or terrorists.

This volume traces the changing relationship between Russia and NATO through the prism of conventional arms control, specifically the negotiation, implementation and adaptation of the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty.

This work argues that nuclear complacency is based on a misreading of history and on unsound political and military analysis. It states that the Soviet-American nonbelligerence of the Cold War is transferable into a multipolar, post-Cold War international system.

The final part, Beyond Deterrence, considers war termination scenarios and related issues, including sociopolitical aspects, surveys the part nuclear weapons play in superpower competition in the Third World, and explains how issues of sovereignty effect deterrence, avoidance, and future super power relations.

This edited collection considers the future of nuclear weapons in world politics in terms of security issues that are important for U.S. and other policy makers. The spread of nuclear weapons also is related to the equally dangerous proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, and of ballistic missiles of medium and longer ranges.Cold War studies of nuclear weapons emphasized the U.S.-Soviet relationship, deterrence, and bilateral arms control. A less structured post-Cold War world will require more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of roles that nuclear weapons might play in the hands of new nuclear states or non-state actors. As the essays suggest as well, the possibility of terrorism by means of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction introduces other uncertainties into military and policy planning. An important analysis for scholars, students, and researchers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

The first book to analyze strategic war termination from a policy perspective, Strategic War Termination explores present US policy on termination and recommends strategies for improving it.

This work aims to show why the prevention, management and conclusion of war require an understanding of the subjective aspects of decision making, as well as of the hardware and tactics of military operations. Past US security policy decisions are combined with future problems to distill lessons.

Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century.

The future of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in the 21st century is not entirely predictable from the Cold War past.

The author of this book contrasts the Cold War and post-Cold War environments for the pursuit of military advantage through nuclear deterrence and warns against complacent acceptance of nuclear weapons spread.

Stephen Cimbala argues that deterrence characteristics of the pre-Cold War period will in the 21st century again become normative.

Focuses on the evolution of nuclear weapons as components of US military strategy and arms control, by contrasting their roles in the early and later information ages.