Böcker av Peter (Professor of Philosophy Unger

During the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Instead, philosophers offered conceptual truths. It is widely assumed that, since 1970, things have changed greatly.

While well-known for his longer book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's shorter articles have, until now, been less accessible. Collected in two volumes, Philosophical Papers includes articles spanning over 40 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Volume two focuses on Unger's important work in metaphysics.

While well-known for his longer book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's shorter articles have, until now, been less accessible. Collected in two volumes, Philosophical Papers includes articles spanning over 40 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics.

Suggests that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have a reason at all for anything. The author argues that no one can ever say, let alone believe, that anything is the case, and also proposes a radical departure from the linguistic and epistemological systems we have become accustomed to.

Questions the objective answers that have been given to traditional problems of philosophy. The author casts doubt on the generally unquestioned view that fundamental questions pertaining to meaning and existence have direct solutions, arguing that by their very nature they remain ultimately unanswerable.

The topic of personal identity has prompted lively debates in recent philosophy. In a contribution to the discussion, the author of this treatise presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time.

Unger argues that our intuitions about ethical cases are generated not by basic moral values, but by certain distracting moral mechanisms that encourage deceptive reactions. He proposes a complex and novel metaethics arguing that we easily generate a lenient or tough context in which to make ethical assessments.