Böcker av Ammunition United States. Department of the Army Allocations Committee

First published in 1978. From the preface: "The purpose of this monograph is to relate in specific terms what logisticians did and how they did it in supporting combat forces in Vietnam. Not only were American soldiers supported, but at the height of hostilities, in addition to U.S. Forces, the U.S. Army in Vietnam also provided support to the military forces of the governments of South Vietnam, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and other allied countries".

First published in 1975. From the preface: "The North Vietnamese Army units deployed just north of the demilitarized zone in 1966 posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. This is an account of the North Vietnamese attempts to seize control of these two provinces and of the response of the Free World Military Assistance Forces. The period covered by this narrative is from the spring of 1966 to the spring of 1968 and is the story, primarily, of U.S. Army units".

First published in 1973. From the preface: "This monograph describes U.S. Army Riverine planning and operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the years 1966 through 1969. Since the personal experience of the author was with preparations for riverine operations and the initial operations themselves, emphasis has been placed on these activities through early 1968. In summarizing operations conducted in the balance of the three-year period, particular attention has been called to significant trends or changes in riverine operations in Vietnam, a co-operative enterprise of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy".

First published in 1978. From the preface: "This monograph is an account of the operations of armored units of the United States Army in the Republic of Vietnam. The term armored units as used here is generic and includes tank and mechanized infantry battalions and companies, armored cavalry squadrons and troops, and air cavalry squadrons and troops-all forces whose primary modus operandi was to fight mounted".

First published in 1975. From the preface: "The purpose of this monograph is to describe the presence of law at a particular time and in a particular American command in Vietnam. I have selected the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as the headquarters, and the crucial years of 1964 through 1966 as the primary but not exclusive period of time to study, partly because as the senior legal officer, the Staff Judge Advocate at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, then, I was most familiar with events, but in the main because it was in that headquarters and at that time that basic policy positions were formed. It was early apparent that law could have a special role in Vietnam because of the unusual circumstances of the war, which was a combination of internal and external war, of insurgency and nation-building, and of development of indigenous legal institutions and rapid disintegration of the remnants of the colonial French legal establishment. Further, the Vietnamese people were eager for knowledge of American institutions, including law".

First published in 1975. From the preface: "This monograph will illuminate some of the more important activities - with attendant problems, shortcomings, and achievements - of the U.S. Army Field Artillery in Vietnam. The wide variations in terrain, supported forces, density of cannon, friendly population, and enemy activity which prevailed throughout South Vietnam tend to make every action and every locale singular. Though based largely upon documents of an historical nature and organized in a generally chronological manner, this study does not purport to provide the precise detail of history. Its purpose is to present an objective review of the near past in order to assure current awareness, on the part of the Army, of the lessons we should have learned and to foster the positive consideration of those lessons in the formulation of appropriate operational concepts. My hope is that this monograph will give the reader an insight into the immense complexity of our operations in Vietnam. I believe it cannot help but reflect also the unsurpassed professionalism of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers of the Field Artillery and the outstanding morale and esprit de corps of the young citizen-soldiers with whom they served".

First published in 1982. From the preface: "Communications is the primary mission of the Signal Corps and its members. Division-Level Communications is a story not only of some very fine Signal Corps units and individuals but also of many other communicators from the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and all other branches of the Army. It is a combined arms story; on the battlefield, communications is everybody's business. The scope of this study includes the stateside alert and readying of units for Vietnam duty and the reaction of the Army training base to supply the volume of trained specialists needed to man the equipment associated with a modern communications system. The transition from peacetime status to battlefield effectiveness is always difficult, normally made more so because of severe shortages of time, equipment, and skilled men. The study points out examples of errors and shortfalls without losing sight of the things that went right. Vietnam unit after-action reports and senior officer end-of-tour debriefing reports were notable in their paucity of complaints about communications difficulties; things did go right in the communications field most of the time. Communications, mobility, and firepower formed the triad upon which Vietnam tactical operations were based. Data for this monograph was drawn primarily from after action reports and interviews, documented lessons learned, official reports, and recent interviews and letters from numerous individuals who served with the seven divisions and five separate brigades and regiments which were the heart of divisional communications. Sincere appreciation goes to the many communicators and commanders, active and retired, who shared heir experiences, photographs, and papers so that this volume could be written. A special word of thanks is reserved for those members of the Signal School staff who assisted in researching and organizing this monograph".

First published in 1975. From the preface: ""In 1954 the Army of South Vietnam was a collection of former French colonial troops with little command experience and no support forces worthy of mention. Gradually and despite a considerable degree of political and social instability, the Army, with strong American assistance, was molded into an effective fighting force by the efforts of Vietnamese leaders. After 1960 the South Vietnamese Army also acquired a counterinsurgency capability, but by 1965 increased political turmoil had undermined its effectiveness and necessitated the intervention of strong US combat forces. From 1965 to 1968, while US forces bore the brunt of the fighting, the South Vietnamese slowly regrouped and, with increasing American advisory assistance and matériel support, once again became an effective fighting force. During this period the military provided security for the civilian population and administration and, in schools and training centers, laid the basis for a larger and more responsive military force. The battles of the Tet offensive of 1968 were followed by the general mobilization of South Vietnam and, one year later, by the decision of the United States to begin troop redeployments. These moves set the stage for the third phase in the Army's development, Vietnamization. The years from 1968 to 1972 saw a great expansion of South Vietnam's territorial security forces and militia, and the continual improvement and modernization of the regular Army as it once again assumed complete responsibility for the war effort. This monograph, covering the three stages in the growth and development of the South Vietnamese Army, highlights the role of the US Army, especially the MACV advisory system. Most of the material presented is based on official historical summaries prepared on a regular basis by the major US military commands in South Vietnam. Special attention is given to the expansion of South Vietnam's training base and her increasingly sophisticated military school system. While such a study can do no more than survey these activities, it does reflect the deep and continuous commitment by thousands of American soldiers to make the South Vietnamese Army a self-sufficient force capable of defending itself with minimum outside assistance".

First published in 1973. From the preface: """"Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point has been written at the request of General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, who, concerned about the lack of authoritative accounts of various actions and activities in Vietnam, desired that a series of monographs be prepared to fill the void in the Army's historical library. Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY took place during the first five months of 1967 and were the first multidivisional operations in Vietnam to be conducted according to a preconceived plan. They were to result in a turning point in the war: they confirmed that such operations do have a place in counterinsurgency warfare today; they brought an end to the enemy's thinking that his third phase of the war- large-scale operations throughout the country -would be successful; they caused the enemy to re-evaluate his tactics and revert to smaller-scale guerrilla operations; they destroyed his camps, pillaged his supplies, and killed hundreds of his best troops; they proved to the enemy that his old sanctuaries were no longer inviolable, thus causing him to depend primarily upon those located over the border in Cambodia; they helped convince the enemy that the maintenance of large bases and main force units near urban areas was risky business; and they enhanced immeasurably the confidence of the allied forces in South Vietnam, a confidence which had been growing since the dark days of the first half of 1965. Thus CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY were to become the most important operations of the war to that time, and perhaps since"".

First published in 1972.

First published in 1974. From the preface: ""More than forty nations provided assistance to the Republic of Vietnam in its struggle against North Vietnam. This aid ranged from economic and technical assistance to educational and humanitarian contributions. Hundreds of Free World civilians worked in Vietnam as doctors, teachers, and technical specialists. Eight nations also provided military assistance. The flags of these Free World countries-the United States, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of China, and Spain-flew alongside the colors of the Republic of Vietnam at the headquarters of the Free World Military Assistance Forces in Saigon. The military contributions of these nations included combat troops, army medical teams, and individual political warfare advisers. The degree of assistance and co-operation among the concerned Free World nations resulted from years of work and involvement. While many nations expressed sympathy for the plight of South Vietnam, aid did not always come easily, quickly, or to the extent desired. Many nations, beset by their own internal economic and political problems, could do little to help; others did nothing. The story of the efforts of the contributing nations and the efforts to enlist their aid is the subject of this monograph"".

First published in 1973. From the preface: "The purpose of this study is to trace the evolution of airmobility in the U.S. Army. The integration of aircraft into the organic structure of the ground forces is as radical a change as the move from the horse to the truck, and the process is only beginning. Because this change is not the product of one man or one small group of men but rather a fortunate confluence of technology, tactics, and imagination, proper credit to every responsible individual is impossible. I have tried to identify some of those people who made a major contribution throughout the years. Although Vietnam was the first large combat test of airmobility, air assault operations in Southeast Asia would not have been possible without certain key decisions a decade earlier. This study attempts to trace the most important milestones which led to the eventual formation of airmobile divisions".