Böcker i Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind-serien

This volume is a collection of essays on a special theme in Aristotelian philosophy of mind: the internal senses.

In its conclusion, the book claims that intentionality in Mulla Sadra combines ontological and psychological realities and that as a result of Sadrian monism, the intentionality, intentional object, the agent, and the reality are different versions of same reality.

This volume focuses on philosophical problems concerning sense perception in the history of philosophy.

For this reason, the editors stress the importance of raising analytical questions about the valence of particular emotions and focussing on the features that make these emotions ambivalent: how - despite their negativity - such emotions may turn out to be positive.

This monograph presents an interpretation of Descartes's dualism, which differs from the standard reading called 'classical separatist dualism' claiming that the mind can exist without the body.

This edited work draws on a range of contributed expertise to trace the fortune of an Aristotelian thesis over different periods in the history of philosophy. It presents eight cases of direct or indirect challenges to the Aristotelian passive account of human cognition, taking the reader from late antiquity to the 20th century. Chapters analyse the (often indirect) effect of Aristotle¿s account of cognition on later periods. In his influential De anima, Aristotle describes human cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, as the reception of a form in the cognitive subject. Aristotle¿s account has been commonly interpreted as fundamentally passive ¿ the cognitive subject is a passive actor upon which a cognitive process is acted by the object. However, at least from the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias onwards, this interpretationhas been challenged by authors who posit a fundamental active aspect of cognition. Readers will discover how one or more of three concerns ¿ ontological superiority, direct realism and moral responsibility ¿ drive the active accounts of cognition. Contributed chapters from top scholars examine how these three concerns lead thinkers to take issue with the idea that cognition is a passive process. The authors consider Jesuit accounts of cognition, Malebranche on judgment, and Wittgenstein on perception, as well as Stumpf on active cognition, among other relevant works.This book is ideally suited to scholars of philosophy, especially those with an interest in medieval epistemology, the influence of Aristotle, philosophy of mind and theories of cognition.

This book investigates Aristotelian psychology through his works and commentaries on them, including De Sensu, De Memoria and De Somno et Vigilia.

This volume focuses on philosophical problems concerning sense perception in the history of philosophy.

This book offers new insights into the workings of the human soul and the philosophical conception of the mind in Ancient Greece.

This book explores a wide range of topics relating to scientific and religious learning in the work of Bishop Robert Grosseteste (c.

This edited work draws on a range of contributed expertise to trace the fortune of an Aristotelian thesis over different periods in the history of philosophy. It presents eight cases of direct or indirect challenges to the Aristotelian passive account of human cognition, taking the reader from late antiquity to the 20th century. Chapters analyse the (often indirect) effect of Aristotle¿s account of cognition on later periods. In his influential De anima, Aristotle describes human cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, as the reception of a form in the cognitive subject. Aristotle¿s account has been commonly interpreted as fundamentally passive ¿ the cognitive subject is a passive actor upon which a cognitive process is acted by the object. However, at least from the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias onwards, this interpretation has been challenged by authors who posit a fundamental active aspect of cognition. Readers will discover how one or more of three concerns ¿ ontological superiority, direct realism and moral responsibility ¿ drive the active accounts of cognition. Contributed chapters from top scholars examine how these three concerns lead thinkers to take issue with the idea that cognition is a passive process. The authors consider Jesuit accounts of cognition, Malebranche on judgment, and Wittgenstein on perception, as well as Stumpf on active cognition, among other relevant works.This book is ideally suited to scholars of philosophy, especially those with an interest in medieval epistemology, the influence of Aristotle, philosophy of mind and theories of cognition.

This book is a collection of studies on topics related to subjectivity and selfhood in medieval and early modern philosophy. Instead of a complete overview on the historical period, the book provides detailed glimpses into some of the most important figures of the period, such as Augustine, Avicenna, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume.

This book offers new insights into the workings of the human soul and the philosophical conception of the mind in Ancient Greece.

This book is about the epistemological views and arguments of the early Stoics. He emphasizes how the epistemological views of the Stoics are interrelated among themselves and with views from Stoic physics and logic. There are a number of Stoic views and arguments that we will never know about.

Conjunctions of Mind, Soul and Body from Plato to the Enlightenment

Relying on original Greek and Latin textual sources, this book describes and analyses how the ancient philosophers explained mental illness and its symptoms as well as how they accounted for the respective roles of body and mind in such disorders.

This volume is a collection of essays on a special theme in Aristotelian philosophy of mind: the internal senses.